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ADVANCE NOTICE OF ALIBI*
DAVID M. EPSTEIN
Mr. Epstein is a member of the Bar of Pennsylvania. He received his LL.B. degree from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1963, and his B.A. degree from The Pennsylvania State
University in 1960. While a law student, Mr. Epstein served for a year as Research Assistant to the
Criminal Procedural Rules Committee of the Supreme and Superior Courts of Pennsylvania.
In the following article, Mr. Epstein observes that there is considerable current interest in statutes
requiring the defendant in a criminal case to give advance notice to the prosecution when he intends
to use aflibi as a defense. What is the history of success or failure of alibi rules in jurisdictions which
have adopted them? How do the existing rules differ? What specific terms thereof seem best suited to
accomplish the purpose of the statutes? And what legal issues have been raised pertaining thereto?
In an attempt to answer these and related questions, Mr. Epstein has not only reviewed the relevant
constitutional, statutory, and case law, but has also conducted a field survey in jurisdictions with
alibi rules to ascertain the nature of their operation.-EDroR.
Pretrial discovery in civil suits is now an accomplished fact. Its philosophy-preventing surprise and improving fact ascertainment-is as applicable in criminal .as in civil cases. Yet, pretrial
discovery in criminal cases is practically nonexistent."
Defendants seeking discovery have been met
with three arguments: (1) no common law basis; 2
(2) fear of perjury and intimidation of witnessesand (3) "unfairness" to the prosecution.4 While the5
first two of these have been adequately answered,
the third, because of the self-incrimination protection, remains a substantial obstacle. Neither
prosecutors nor trial judges will agree to criminal
discovery unless it is a two-way street; thus provisions must be made for prosecutors to receive information from defendants before they. will agree
to give it.
This paper concerns one of these provisions* Acknowledgement is made to Professor Caleb
Foote of the University of Pennsylvania Law School
and to Judge Joseph Sloane, Chairman, and Martin
Vinikoor, Executive Director, of the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee of the Supreme and Superior
Courts of Pennsylvania for the opportunity to write
this article and for their aid and guidance.
I See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or
Apparent? 49 CAraF. L. Rnv. 56 (1961); Goldstein,
The Status of Ike Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal 1rocedure,69 YALE L. J. 1149 (1960); Fletcher,

PretrialDiscovery in Stat Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L.

REv. 293 (1960).
2 People ex rd. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y.
24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
3 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884
(1953).
4 State v. Rhodes, 81 Ohio St. 397, 424, 91 N.E.
186, 192 (1910).
5 State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133,145 A.2d 313 (1958).

advance notice to the prosecution when defendant
intends to present an alibi at trial.
At common law all defenses except autrefois
acquit, autrefois convict, and former pardon were
admissible under a plea of not guilty. 6 As a result,
a difficult problem faced the prosecutor, who could
not be prepared to meet any and all defenses. In
1887, Scotland tried to rectify this situation and
required that the defendant give notice when his
defense would be alibi, insanity at the time of the
act, commission of the act by another named and
designated, self-defense, sleep or temporary mental
disassociation, or hysterical amnesiaY In 1920,
Professor Robert W. Millar proposed a similar rule
for American law.8 He singled out alibi as the area
in greatest need of change. Alibi, he observed, was
"one of the main avenues of escape of the guilty";
moreover, he noted, a great amount of unpunished
perjury was committed each year in connection
with the defense. 9
6
Milar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure,
11 J. C x. L. & C. 344, 350 (1920).
7 Defendant was not competent to give testimony or
state a defense unless notice was given at a preliminary
hearing or upon cause shown, two days before trial.
Also, he could not use other witnesses or exhibits
unless written notice of the names of the witnesses
and the designation of exhibits was given three days
before the jury was sworn. If the defendant showed a
prior inability, the court was to allow the witnesses or
exhibits and continue or postpone the case.
The Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1908,
8 Edw. VII, c65, §35, is a similar provision relating
only to alibis in summary proceedings. Defendant
must give the time, place, and witnesses he will use
prior to the examination of the first witness for the
prosecution. Upon such notice the prosecution is
to an adjournment of the case.
entitled
8
9 Millar, supra note 6, at 350.
!bid.
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Other writers in the field also singled out alibi
for special attention, 0 and their efforts first bore
fruit in 1927 when Michigan passed the first
statute dealing with alibi." Ohio followed in 1929,12
and by 1942 twelve other jurisdictions had adopted
some version of it. In December, 1962, an alibi
rule was recommended for adoption as a Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure, 4 and such a rule has
also been submitted to the Supreme and Superior
Courts of Pennsylvania. 5 It is this apparent rebirth of interest in a rule requiring advance notice
of alibi, plus the importance such a rule bears to
the larger context of criminal discovery, which
has prompted the investigation reported in this
paper.
Because the case law is not informative, a field
research project was conceived to ascertain the
utility of this rule. A questionnaire, set out in
Appendix A, was sent to prosecuting attorneys
in each of the 14 jurisdictions having this rule. The
eight most populous counties in New York and
New Jersey and the seven most populous counties
in the other jurisdictions were chosen. Seventy-nine
responses were received, and 76 of them supplied
data. The percentage figures from these responses
are included with the questionnaire.
The data gathered are referred to at appropriate
places throughout the paper and are also summarized in Appendix A for easy reference. Repre10Burdick, Possibility of Improvement by Statutory
Changes and Constitutional Amendments Affecting
Procedure, 11 A.B.A.J. 510 (1925); Willoughby,
PiNeCIPLs

oF

JUDICIAL

ADmIsTRATiON

450-51

(1929). See also Criminal Law Recommendations to
State Bar Associations IV(b), 59 A.B.A. REP. 112,
129 (1934); Committee on Jurisprudence and Law
Reform, House of Delegates (Second Session, 1939), 25
A.B.A.J. 657, 661; UmiroaR RULES CRr& PRoc.

§26 (1952).

" Micn. STAT. ANN. §§28.1043, 28.1044 (1954).

1
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2945.58 (Page, 1953).
"3Arizona Supreme Court Rule of Criminal Procedure §192; IND. ANN. STAT. §§9-1631, 9-1632,
9-1633 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. §777.18 (1958);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §62-1341 (1949); MIr. STAT.
ANN. §630.14 (1947); N.J. SUPERIOR AND CoUNTYv
COURT CRnmAr. PRACTICE RULE 3:5-5 (1948);
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §295-L (1935); OKI.A. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §585 (1937); S.D. CODE 34.2801 (1939);
UTA CODE. ANN. 77-22-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§6561, 6562 (1958); Wis. STAT. ANN. §955.07

(1958).

14ADvisoRY COMUTTEE ON CRndINAL RULES,
ComMITTE ON RULEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PREUMiNARY DRAFT or PROPosED AmENDmENTs TO
THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DisTRICT COURTS, Rule 12 (a) (Dec. 1962).
1
5 SUPREME AND SUPERIOR COURTS OF PENNSYL-:
VANIA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL RULES COMMITTEE,

PROPOSED RULE 312 (Feb. 1963).

sentative cases from jurisdictions with alibi rules
are set forth in Appendix B.
HISTORY OF

=

ALiBi RULE

Fourteen states adopted some version of this
rule between 1927 and 1942.16 In 1952 a model
provision was adopted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,17 and
it has been recommended by various AttorneysGeneral of the United States8 as well as various
national committees and commissions. 9 Along
with this history of success of the alibi rule, however, run several instances of its failure.
In 1926 it was recommended by the California
State Bar Association and endorsed by the Attorney General of California and the California
Crime Commission, but it was defeated in the California Assembly in 1931.10 In New York its rejec-

tion in four successive legislative assemblies, between 1931 and 1935, brought forth a flow of editorials and articles in the Panel,a local publication
concerned with criminal law. 1 Perhaps because of

them, it was passed in 1935.
The rule was introduced in both the United
States Senate and House of Representatives in
1939. Both bills were referred to committee and
were never reported out." In 1944 the United
States Supreme Court struck two alternate alibi
provisions from the then proposed Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. An unresolved split over
the terms of the rule in the committee submitting
these rules to the Court probably caused this
m
action.
"
The rule was next considered in Illinois in 1947,
where a bill to adopt it was defeated in the Illinois
House Judiciary Committee. The bill was reintro16
In chronological order they are: Michigan, 1927;
Ohio, 1929; New Jersey, 1934; Indiana, 1935; Kansas,
1935; Minnesota, 1935; New York, 1935; Oklahoma,
1935; South Dakota, 1935; Utah, 1935; Vermont,
1935; Wisconsin, 1935; Arizona, 1940- Iowa, 1941.
17UmFoRm RULES CRI.

PROC.,

J26

(1952).

18ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
T=E UNITED STATES (Cummings): 1 (1933); 2 (1936);

11 9(1937); 9 (1938). Id, (Murphy): 7 (1939).

' NAT'L COmx'N OF LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (Wickersham Commission), REPORT ON
CRnuNAL PROCEDURE 47 (1931); PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME 453

(1934).
20

Dean, Advance Specifications of Defense in Criminal

Cases,
20 A.B.A.J. 435, 437 (1934).
21

E.g., Elect Assemblymen Who Will Pass the Alibi
Bill, 9 PANEL 38 (1931); Will Assembly Lawyers Kill
Alibi Bill Again?, 9 PANEL 50 (1931).
2S. 187, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (Ashurst);
H.R.
1995, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (Summers).
2

1 See text at note 66 infra.
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duced without a provision requiring defendant to
name his alibi witnesses, but it failed to pass.?
Finally, in 1960 the California Law Revision
Committee recommended to the legislature that
a rule on alibi be adopted2 5 An alibi bill was introduced in the assembly early in 1961,6 but unlike
1931,27 the California Bar Association took a
stand against the proposal "on the ground [that
the requirement that the names of witnesses be
given] would cause the harrassment and intimidation of alibi witnesses by public officers."28 The
bill failed to pass.
It is submitted that the record reviewed above
is a good record for what is admittedly a radical
idea in criminal procedure, at least in the sense that
it has slim antecedents in the common law.2 In
California, it appears that the rule was rejected
because of the "witness" requirement; in most
instances, however, it appears that the rule has
been rejected mainly because of the continuing
dominance of the common law tradition that
defendant need not disclose his defenses until
trial. ° A recent California case may influence our
attitude toward that tradition.
In Jones v. Superior Court,31 the Supreme Court
of California, Judge Traynor writing for the
majority, granted discovery to the prosecution of
the names of witnesses the accused intended to
call and any reports and x-rays he intended to
introduce in support of his announced defense.
The court relied on the fact that the defense was
an affirmative one and cited the cases upholding
the alibi statutes to refute the argument of selfincrimination. If this case is a harbinger, then
perhaps defendant's right to nondisclosure is
being broken down, at least in the area of affirmative defenses. This development may lead to the
adoption of more alibi statutes in particular and
more statutes dealing with disclosure of affirmative
defenses in general.
An additional reason why the alibi rule has not
been more widely adopted is that criminal procedure has been a neglected area of the law. Most
2

4Note, 39 J. CRan L. & C. 629, 630 (1949).

2

CAL. LAW

REvIsION CoMM., RECOMUM

ATION

AND Sruny RELATNG TO NoTIcE op AnnI rN CnRNum
AcTIoNs (1960).
26Assembly Bill 484, introduced Jan. 17, 1961.
27 See

text at note 20.
B.J. 480, 487 (1961).
]Milar, supra note 6.
m'Fletcher, supra note 1,at 315.
3122 Cal. Reptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919 (1962).
mA fuller treatment of the self-incrimination privilege will be found in the text at notes 44-45 infra.
2336 CAL. STATE

jurisdictions just have not thought about this
problem. For example, a committee of the Supreme
and Superior Courts of Pennsylvania is in the
process of recommending Pennsylvania's first
statewide body of rules of criminal procedure.
The committee has decided to include an alibi rule
in its package.?
REASONS IN FAVOR OF AN

AniI Ri-LE

Five reasons have been advanced in support of
adoption of a requirement of advance notice o
alibi.
One.--Foremost is the idea that the statute
prevents surprise. Alibi has been termed a "hip
pocket" defense because of the ease with which it
can be manufactured for introduction in the final
34
hours of trial
Two.--The statute acts to deter false alibis
because defendants know that the information
furnished will be investigated before trial: (Only
one out of 73 district attorneys responding to the
questionnaire said he did not make a pretrial investigation.)
The deterrent effect is borne out by the field
survey. Eighty per cent of the district attorneys
reported that alibis were offered in zero to 15
per cent of the cases in their jurisdiction. Sixteen
per cent said it arose in 16 to 30 per cent of the
cases, and only four per cent reported that it arose
more frequently. (Appendix A, sub 4.)
Similar results were reported in Ohio and Michigan soon after their statutes were adopted. Ohio
reported that alibis were reduced to a minimum.
The reduction was attributed to the realization
that an alibi refuted in open court is worse than
no defense at all.25 Detroit, Michigan, reported
that the defense was used less, and where used, it
was almost always proved false. It was also noted
that convictions where an alibi was offered had
36
greatly increased since passage of the act.
The field survey yielded similar results with
regard to increase in convictions. Eighty-one per
cent reported that when alibis were offered, they
were only occasionally successful; eleven per cent
said they were successful about half the time; only
eight per cent reported more frequent success.
(Appendix A, sub 5.)
Note 15 supra.
4Stassen, The Show Window of the Bar, 20 MiNN. L.
REv. 577, 580-81 (1936).
s Esch, Ohio's New "Alibi Defense" Statude, 9 PANEL
42 36(1931).

Toy, Michigan Law on Alibi and Insanity Defenses

Reduces Perjury, 9 PAML 52 (1931).
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Three.-Pretrialinvestigation results in a saving
of money and trial time. This occurs in two ways.
(1) If, after the investigation, the district attorney
is satisfied that the alibi is true, the case should be
dismissed,3 (2) the district attorney is not surprised at trial by the alibi defense, and there is no
need for a continuancen to investigate and prepare.
The pretrial investigation may indicate that the
alibi probably is false and/or that defendant's
witnesses are not credible. The district attorney
can prepare his case accordingly.
Here the field survey is particularly interesting.
Nineteen per cent reported no cases dismissed
after pretrial investigation, 58 per cent said a few,
15 per cent said one-half, and only eight per cent
said many. (Appendix A, sub 8.) The fact that
comparatively few cases are dismissed as the
result of a pretrial investigation is entirely consisten± with our notion of alibis-they are usually
false. This result is also consistent with the answers
to the questionnaire reported above indicating
that alibis enjoy comparatively little success
where advance notice is required.
Four.-Alibis which are presented at trial will
be accorded more respect. Alibi, because of the
ease with which it can be manufactured, is treated
by some jurisdictions as a "second-class" affirmative defense, and when an alibi is in issue and the
jury is charged, the judge is allowed to disparage
the defense.9 This rule should make disparagement
40
less necessary.
Five.-Finally, as previously developed, this
rule is important in the context of more liberal
discovery in criminal cases.
5
7In the field survey a few district attorneys reported
that they never dismiss under these circumstances,
because credibility is for the jury. However, if the
district attorney is satisfied as to the truth, this does
not seem to be a sufficient reason for subjecting the
defendant to a trial
'8In addition to a loss of time and money, a continuance is detrimental because it comes a'ter the
prosecution has presented its case and thus its evidence
gets "cold."
n Commonwealth v. White, 271 Pa. 584, 115 At.
870 (1922); People v. Tice, 115 Mich. 219, 73 N.W.
108 (1897). Contra, Asher v. State, 201 Ind. 353, 168
N.E. 456 (1929).
40In State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937),
a Utah court said that this statute was a recognition by
the legislature that this defense lends itself to fraud
and perjury, and that with the safeguards the statute
provides, alibis should be given more weight since
investigation has failed to refute them. People v.
Woolworth, 148 Kan. 180, 81 P.2d 43 (1938), and
People v. Marcus, 253 Mich. 410, 235 N.W. 202 (1931),
are contra.
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Following is an analysis of the legal issues presented by a requirement of advance notice of alibi.
Constitutional Issues
Self-incrimination.-While the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not
apply in state courts, 4 ' most state constitutions
extend the privilege against self-incrimination and
follow the federal example by couching it in terms
of compulsion.42 Therefore, when the argument is
made that advance notice of alibi violates one's
privilege against self-incrimination, it is answered
that the prosecution must still
establish defendant's presence at the scene of the crime and
that defendant need not establish that he was
somewhere else. Only if defendant voluntarily
decides to present an alibi at trial must he give the
required information. If there is compulsion, it is
only as to the time when the prosecution learns of
the defense, because in no event is defendant compelled to give information he was not otherwise
planning to present at trial.
Two other answers to this argument are: (1)
the rule is one of pleading, and defendant is not
giving evidence against himself; (2) the information given is exculpatory, not incriminating.4
In apparently the only case in which the issue
was raised, People v. Schade,45 all three answers
to the argument were presented, and the statute
was upheld as constitutional.
Due Process.-The due process issue has been
raised in two slightly different forms. First it has
been argued that the requirement of advance
notice deprives defendant of the advantage of
surprise he formerly enjoyed.46 As a practical
matter, however, if continuances are given to the
prosecution when there is surprise, this advantage
is quickly dissipated. If there is a true advantage,
this statute represents a procedural, not a substantive change in the law, and the defendant is
not entitled to one form of procedure in exclusion
41 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 374 (1958).
4 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V: "...
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ......
43Dean, supra note 20, at 440.
44Millar, Statutory Notice of Alibi, 24 J. Cms. L. &
C. 849, 852 (1934).
41People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N.Y.S. 612
(Queens
County Ct. 1936).
46
This is the thrust of the argument the dissent
makes in Jones v. Superior Court, supranote 31, at 885.
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of all others. In People v.Hickman,0 defendant
argued that the recently-adopted changes in the
California procedure for placing insanity in issue
violated due process. This argument was rejected,
the court saying:
"It does not follow that merely because something has been actual law of the land from time
out of mind, it is therefore due process. (Hurtado
v.California, 110 U.S. 516, 529.) The common
law is only one of the forms of the law and is no
more sacred than any other." 0
Secondly, it may be argued that when defendant
is required to give advance notice in order to
present his defense and is precluded from presenting this defense when he fails to give notice,
he is denied due process. Again the argument
is that the change is substantive, not procedural.
Defendant is entitled to present his defenses
provided he follows a reasonable requirement
calculated to speed the trial and facilitate the factfinding process. Thus, in People v. LaCrosse,0
defendant failed to follow the California procedure
for raising the defense of insanity and was precluded from offering evidence. The court said:
"There has been no denial of the Constitutional
guarantee of .due process, but merely a failure to
use due process provided for the defendant's
benefit."50 In an earlier case, People v.Troche,'A
it was held that due process may include new methods of procedure, provided they are in harmony
with the tradition of the common law-they
must be orderly and provide for reasonable notice
and opportunity to be heard.n
Non-ConstitutionalIssues
Alibi as Rebttal.-May defendant offer evidence
as to his whereabouts, not by way of an affirmative
defense of alibi, but in rebuttal to the prosecution's
evidence?
Obviously an affirmative answer here would
nullify the effect of the advance notice rule, and
this issue was quickly disposed of in State v.
Thayer," in Ohio. The court pointed out that an
alibi, by definition, rebuts the prosecution's eviaPeople v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470, 268 Pac. 909
(1928).
48 Id. at 479, 268 Pac. at 913.
495 Cal. App. 2d 696, 43 P.2d 596 (1935).
wId.at 698, 43 P.2d at 597.
51206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac. 767 (1928).
c2Jd.at 42, 273 Pac. at 770.
124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N.E. 656 (1931). See also
State v. Nooks, 123 Ohio St. 190, 174 N.E. 743 (1930).

dence, since except where the charge is aiding and
abetting, the state must offer proof placing defendant at the scene of the crime.5
Defendant's Right To Testify.-May the defendant be precluded from testifying, as to his
whereabouts?
At common law the defendant was not allowed
to testify because of the fear he would perjure
himself."5 Most jurisdictions, either by statute"
or by constitution,n have made the defendant a
competent witness.
When the enabling provision is in the constitution, it is clear that the defendant cannot be
denied the right to testify. The legislature cannot
by statute modify a constitutional provision.
Where, however, it is statutory, the courts have
split on the issue. On the one hand, People v.
Rakiec" held that the New York provision on
alibi did not affect defendant's statutory right to
testify on his own behalf. The court stated that the
alibi provision and the testimonial provision would
be construed as compatible in the absence of clear
legislative intent to the contrary. On the other
hand, in Smetana v. State," the Ohio Court of
Appeals held that defendant's statutory rights
could be altered by the legislature and that adoption of the alibi statute signified legislative intent
to alter the earlier provision.
As a matter of policy, allowing the defendant to
testify will not nullify the effect of the alibi statute.
The statute's main thrust concerns the parade of
alibi witnesses for the defendant. The latter's
testimony, standing alone, is unlikely to receive
much credit by a jury.
Comment by the Prosecutor -May the prosecution comment on the fact that the defendant has
given notice and then failed to introduce evidence
of alibi?
In People v. Mancini,6 ' defendant gave notice
that four witnesses would establish his alibi. None
appeared. It was held error for the prosecution to
"Id. at 4, 176 N.E. at 658.
5Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 483, 140 N.E.
364 (1922); Brown v. United States, 56 F.2d 997, 999
(9th Cir. 1932).
5E.g., 18 U.S.C. §3481 (1951); N.Y. CODE CRI3s
PRoc. §393 (1935); Oaro REv. CODE Axx. 2945.43
(Page 1954).
6E.g., PA. CoNsT. art. 1, §9.
"People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 23 N.Y.S.2d
607, affd, 289 N.Y. 306,45 N.E.2d 812 (1942).
22 Ohio L. Abs. 165 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936).
6 N.Y.2d 853, 188 N.Y.S.2d 559, 160 N.E.2d 91
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1959).
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attempt to establish that the notice given by the
defendant required that he produce the witnesses
and to attempt to cross examine him on his failure
to do so. In State v. Cocco,6' an Ohio court held that
defendant was prejudiced when the prosecuting
attorney read defendant's notice of alibi to the
jury during preliminary argument.
BASIC COMProNENTS

OF mu AxJi RuL.Es

In all but two62 of the 143 jurisdictions requiring
advance notice of alibi, the rule is statutory. In
the others, the rule is promulgated by the judiciary.
This section includes a discussion of the terms of
these rules and how they vary
Demand by the Prosecutor.-Minnesota, New
York, and New Jersey require that the district
attorney make demand on the defendant for his
notice. Failure to make this demand has been held
to relieve the defendant from his obligation." The
remaining jurisdictions require that defendant
give notice without any request.
The question whether the prosecution should
be required to act first is the issue which split the
original committee recommending Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 65 Rule 17 in the preliminary
draft required that the government give notice
and specify with reasonable certainty its contention as to the date and time the offense was committed. Defendant was then required to give
notice if he intended to offer an alibi. Rule 16 in
the second draft altered this. It required the
defendant to initiate the process by moving to
have the government state with greater particularity the time and place it would rely on, and
upon receipt of this, defendant was to give his
notice. This change was vehemently objected to by
five members of the committee, and both rules
were submitted to the Supreme Court with accompanying memoranda. Herbert Wechsler wrote
for the minority and argued that if the government
gave notice first, uncounseled defendants as well
as uninformed attorneys would be advised of the
requirement, and no penalty would attach to ignorance of the law. He also arguedthat prior notice by
the government was desirable as a matter of tactics.
He pointed out that a defendant may fail to give
notice on purpose, so that when the prosecutor's
6173
6

Ohio App. 182, 55 N.E.2d 430 (1943).

Arizona and New Jersey.

6Notes 11, 12, 13 supra.
4 State v. Wiedenmayer, 128 N.J.L. 239, 25 A.2d
210 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1942).
65See text at note 23 supra.
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objection to the evidence is sustained, the jury
may think that defendant is being deprived of
proof. Such a maneuver could decide a close case.
To refute the majority's contention that the
prosecutor would have to serve notice in all cases
to avoid the risk of failure to do so, Wechsler maintained that the prosecutor knows when to expect
66
an alibi and can make demand when necessary.
Alexander -Holtzhoffanswered these arguments
in the majority's memorandum. He argued that
the court would have discretion in applying the
sanction and could relieve the ignorant defendant.
He also argued that when the government is the
initiator, it is inviting the defense.6"
I believe the minority's is the more salutary provision, but for reasons in addition to those advanced in the committee. Before they are discussed,
however, brief reference must be made to the
problem of insuring that defendant is informed of
thejprecise date and time the prosecution will rely
on af&'rial.6
In most cases the indictment or information
charging the crime includes the date to be relied
on, though the qualification "on or about" usually
appears therewith. The accused, then, is able to
give notice on the basis of the information so
furnished. Occasionally, however, the prosecution
is not able to pinpoint the date and time, and the
indictment or information includes only an approximation. The defendant, then, must request
particulars. Usually the district attorney provides
the information willingly.6 9 Sometimes, however,
the defendant must make a formal motion, resulting in a loss of time and money.
The rule proposed by the committee majority,
as well as the practice in the majority of states,
may thus involve three steps for the defense: (1)
asking the district attorney for the date and time
he will rely on; (2) moving for a bill of particulars,
if necessary; (3) giving notice. Under the minority
rule, however, two of these three steps are eliminated; the defendant need not give notice unless
66Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Second
Draft
239-40 (1944).
6
67 Id., at 241-42.
8This is to be distinguished from the issue which
arises when the proof at trial varies from the time
stated in the indictment or information. Usually
defendant would be allowed a continuance on the
ground of surprise or would be allowed to present his
alibi for the new time without prior notice.
9Ninety per cent of the district attorneys who
responded to the questionnaire said they cooperate
with defendants' attorneys and give the requested
information.
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and until he has received a request along with the
requisite information from the district attorney.
The minority proposal, for this reason, is a more
efficient procedure. The current Advisory Committee on the federal rules plans to recommend an
alibi rule in the form of the original minority
proposalY0
Deadline.-The deadline for giving notice varies
from two to ten days before trial. If the information is specific enough, even the relatively short
time of two days should be sufficient.
Place and 'Time oJ Wlzereabouts.-All except
Iowa and Minnesota require that defendant give
specific information as to the place he claims to
have been at the time of the alleged crime. Iowa
district attorneys receive the same information,
however, because defendant's notice must contain
the names of witnesses and a statement of what he
expects to prove by the testimony of each of them.
Minnesota, however, requires only that he specify
the county or municipality in which lie claims to
have been; therefofe, only after defendant has
elaborated on the information contained in his
notice, through testimony, can the prosecutor
investigate the alibi. Consequently, Minnesota
prosecutors ire in about the same position as if
no notice requirement existed2'
Names of Witnesses.-The most controversial
issue has been the provision contained in some
versions of the rule requiring the defendant to
supply the names of his alibi witnesses. Professor
Millar thought that such a provision was responsible for New York's initial failure to adopt
the rule j 2 The California Bar Association recently
recommended that a bill be defeated because of this
provisionY Nevertheless, one-haF 4 of the 14 states
have this requirement. District attorneys favor
it, maintaining that it facilitates investigation and
preparation. Defense attorneys oppose it, contending there is a danger of intimidation.
No clear policy position recommends itself with
regard to the witness requirement. A comparison of
field survey results from jurisdictions with and
without this requirement fails to reveal any significant factors to resolve the issue. The statute,
however, appears to be effective even if witnesses
70 Note 14 supra.
71
Stassen, supra note 34, at 581.
7 Millar, supra note 44, at 858. His prophesy proved
incorrect; the rule was subsequently adopted with the
witness requirement in it.
7 Note 28 supra.
71Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey,
New York, and Wisconsin.

need not be named. Consequently, an assessment
of legislative attitude seems in order, and if inclusion of the witness requirement would endanger
passage, it should be eliminated to save the
measure. The advantages of an alibi rule without
the witness requirement are greater than no rule
at all.
New Jersey has attempted to resolve this issue
by a kind of compromise. Under its provision,
defendant must name his witnesses, but can also
demand the names of witnesses whom the prosecution intends to call to place him at the scene of the
crime. This solution, however, may be a paper
solution, only, from the defendant's point of view.
Without sanctions, it is likely to be ineffective.
Moreover, the defendant may not have the opportunity, financial or otherwise, to make much
use of the information he receives.
Sanctiom.-Most important is the sanction
imposed for failure to give notice within the
requisite time. Two approaches have been used:
(1) All but Iowa and Oklahoma provide that
alibi evidence may be excluded, but provide that
the trial court, for good cause shown, may admit
the testimony, usually with a continuance granted
to the prosecution. Kansas varies this provision and
allows late filing until the jury is sworn and then
makes exclusion mandatory.
(2) Iowa and Oklahoma provide that when
notice is not given, upon motion of the district
attorney, the court may grant a continuance.l
Excluding the evidence has proved effective.
Eighty-one per cent of the district attorneys
thought that the rule was generally obeyed and
timely notice given. With the responses from
Oklahoma excluded7 this figure rises to 86 per
71In State v. Rourick, 245 Iowa 319, 60 N.W.2d
529 (1953), after the prosecution rested, defendant
presented alibi witnesses. The prosecution's objection
was sustained, because there had been no notice.
Defendant asked for permission to give notice and for
a continuance, which were also denied. On appeal, no
error. The court held that the Iowa statute provided
for a continuance only if notice was late, but before
trial. If notice was not given before trial, alibi was not
an issue in the case, and defendant's witnesses were
properly excluded because their testimony was not
relevant to any issue in the case.
This case has had the effect in Iowa of acting as an
exclusionary rule for alibis presented at trial without
prior notice. The field survey results were consistent
with those from the jurisdictions which have a statutory rule of exclusion.
76Four out of seven Oklahoma County Attorneys
said the rule was not enforced in their jurisdiction,
and a fifth, who shall go unnamed, was not aware of
its existence. This figure was far above the average
from all the jurisdictions.
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cent. In contrast, the threat of a continuance is
not a sanction at all; the prosecution would be
granted a continuance on the ground of surprise,
even without the statutory direction. If all the
defendant risks is a continuance, he will purposely
not give notice because the continuance is valuable
to him. When it is granted, it comes after the prosecution has presented its evidence and allows it to
get cold. The effect of using continuance as a
"sanction" is also contra the deep concern of the
bench and bar with trial delay.
These thoughts were best expressed by an
Oklahoma County Attorney who wrote:
"[The statute] is of no practical value in the
enforcement of the law in this state. [The 5-day
provision is ignored and this] renders the statute
a vehicle for a continuance which theprosecution,
with witnesses brought in for trial, does not
wart.... The statute should bar alibi as a

defense unless the 5-day notice is given-period.
...I would favor a 5-day notice statute which
'
could be seriously and honestly enforced."
THE Fmu SuRvEY

The questionnaire used in the field survey is set
forth in Appendix A. Percentages for the various
responses are presented both for all responses received and for responses from the 20 most populous
counties polled. The latter responses were tabulated because some district attorneys who responded stated that they had little actual
experience with alibi. The 20 counties selected all
had populations exceeding 400,000. Their responses
thus may be more accurate and revealing than
those from the remaining areas.
SUMMARY

As the field study indicates, rules requiring advance notice of alibi are, for the most part, operating as intended. Alibis are not relied on as often
as in the past; when they are presented, the surprise
element is removed and the prosecutor is prepared
to rebut them. Similar benefits could also be derived from rules requiring information concerning
other affirmative defenses, such as insanity and
self-defense. Perhaps one rule could take care of
them all. However, it would be unfair to the
defendant to require such information unless the
prosecution is prepared to make concessions as
well. This brings us back to our starting point.
Pretrial criminal discovery is a desirable goal. The
1 Letter to author from Chester D. Silvers, County
Attorney, Comanche County, Lawton, Oklahoma.

alibi rule could be part of a package which would
represent a step toward that goal.
APPENDIX A
FiELD SURvEY QuEsTIoNNAI
AND RESPONSES
FROM PROsEcuTORs IN JURISDIcTIONS WITH
RULES REQUIRING ADvANCE NOTICE o

ALrBI*

1. The case law on these statutes is very sparse.
Would you say this is because:
11 %t (6%)tt a) the statute is not enforced in your jurisdiction.
81% (94%)
b) the statute is generally
avoided and defendants
give timely notice when
evidence of an alibi is to
be offered.
8%
(-)
c) other reasons (please
elaborate).
(Some of the responses to (c) were "defendants
don't appeal," "the case law is not sparse,"
"statute is ineffective.")
2. When timely notice is not given and defendant
wishes to introduce an alibi at trial, is it the
usual case that:
37% (30%) a) a continuance is granted to
the prosecution?
20% (30%) b) your office does not press
the statute and allows the
evidence to come in?
35% (40%) c) the evidence is excluded?
(8% of the overall responses were that the evidence comes in over the prosecuting attorney's
objection.)
(It is in this phase of the process that tactics
dictate a given course, and this accounts for the
divergence of answers. If notice is late but before
trial, then either exclusion or a continuance is in
order. If notice comes after the prosecution has
rested its case, a continuance will have the effect
of making the prosecution's evidence stale. Exclusion could raise sympathy for the defendant,
which could determine a close case. The point is
that there is no one answer here. This is not a
reason for rejecting this rule, however, because as
* This questionnaire was sent to prosecuting attorneys in the eight most populous counties in New York
and New Jersey and the seven most populous counties
in the 12 remaining jurisdictions. Seventy-six responses
containing data were received.
t Percentage of total responses received.
ttPercentage of responses from the 20 most populous counties polled (all over 400,000 in population).
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*the responses to question one indicate, in the great
majority of cases, this question is never reached.)
3. If the legislature in your jurisdiction were to
repeal this statute, would your successful
prosecution of cases:
28% (37%) a) be seriously affected?
53% (52%) b) be partially affected?
19% (11%) c) not be affected at all?
4. It has been said that these statutes are essential because alibis are commonly relied on
as a deflnse. In your jurisdiction is an alibi
offered in:
80% (74%) a) 0-15%
16% (21%) b) 16-30%
4%
(5%) c) 31-60%
(-)
d) 61-100%
of the cases, excluding guilty pleas, which go
to trial?
5. Is it your experience that when alibis are presented, they are successful:
81% (89%) 'a) occasionally?
11%
(11%) b) aboutone-half?
8%
(-)
c) frequently?
6. Although these statutes do have the sanction
of exclusion, there are few cases where this has
actually been invoked. In your jurisdiction,
when timely notice is not given and an alibi is
offered, is evidence of alibi excluded:
26% (19%) a) never?
26% (44%) b) seldom?
2%
(4%) c) about one-half?
25% (33%) d) frequently?
21%
(-)
e) always?
(This question is very similar to question two,
and the divergence of answers here is consistent
with the results for that question.)
7. One of the advantages of these statutes would
seem to be that they lead to a speedy disposition when notice is given and the alibi is investigated and found to be true. As a practical
matter, how realistic is the view? In your
jurisdiction
(-)
a) investigations
are
not
made.
32% (32%) b) investigations are made
but are not fruitful.
68% (68%) c) investigations are made
and are fruitful.
(Only one out of 73 responses said he did not
investigate.)

8. If your investigations are fruitful, how many
cases can be expected to be nolle prossed or
similarly disposed of after investigation of
alibis?
19% (13%) a) None
58% (63%) b) Few
15%
(5%) c) About one-half
8% (19%) d) Many
(Many responses expressed the view that most
alibis are false and that few were dismissed after
investigation for this reason.)
9. What is the approximate number of indictments returned in your jurisdiction in a
twelve-month period?
(This question was to be used to try to gauge
whether practices were different in the busier
counties. Because procedures vary so widely, this
plan did not work out, and instead, as noted, the
20 most populous counties were separately tabulated.)
10. It has been said that one of the difficulties
with these statutes is that defendant is indicted
"on or about" a day certain and doesn't know
the exact day or time of the crime. Is it your
practice to grant a bill of particulars upon
demand from defendant?
90% (92%) a) Yes!
10%
(8%) b) No!
11. (This pertains only to those jurisdictions which
require the prosecuting attorney to initiate
this procedure by requesting notice.)
Which of the following procedures is used?
a) A standard form is presented to each
person arrested and/or indicted for a crime
other than a summary offense.
b) This is done only with major felonies
(violent crimes).
c) Some other criteria are used. (Please
elaborate.)
(Of 13 responses from three states with this requirement, six chose (a), four chose (b), and three
chose (c). Elaboration on (c) consisted mainly of
statements that the prosecutor used his judgment.)
State
CountyAPPENDIX B
REPRESENTATIVE CASES IN JURISDICTIONS HAVING
ALIBI RULES

Below are representative cases, where available,
indicating how the jurisdictions have enforced

DAVID M. EPSTEIN

their rules. The scarcity of the cases indicates the
importance of the field survey.
Arizona-no cases.
Indiana-Indiana courts have been strict in
their administration of this rule. In Thomas v.
State, 237 Ind. 537, 147 N.E.2d 577, 578 (1958),
it was held that the rule was a "statutory condition
precedent to the introduction of evidence on the
question of alibi." (The Indiana rule says the
evidence shall be excluded in the absence of a
showing of good cause for failure to give notice.)
In Pearman v. State, 233 Ind. 111, 117 N.E.2d 362
(1954), the tables were turned. Indiana requires
the prosecution to give defendant notice when the
date it will rely on is different from the one for
which defendant gave notice. Prosecution's evidence concerning the second date was excluded
when notice was not given and no good cause shown
for failure.
Iowa-State v. Rourick, note 75 supra. If
notice is late but before trial, a continuance is
granted to the prosecutor.
Kansas--In State v. Osburn, 171 Kan. 330,
232 P.2d 451 (1951), it was held that "compliance
with the requirement of this section of the statute
is a prerequisite to the admission of the testimony
of alibi witnesses." (Kansas allows a late filing in
the discretion of the trial judge until the jury is
sworn, and then exclusion is mandatory in the
absence of notice.) In Statev. Leigh, 166 Kan. 104,
199 P.2d 504 (1948), the trial court distinguished
"faraway" alibis and alibis in the "same vicinity
and in the same county or in the same city" and
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applied the statute only to the latter. This interpretation was rejected on appeal. See also Burns v.
Anrine, 156 Kan. 83, 131 P.2d 884 (1942); State
v. Parker, 166 Kan. 707, 204 P.2d 584 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860; and State v. Trams,
189 Kan. 393, 369 P.2d 223 (1962).
Michigan-In People v. McFadden, 347 Mich.
357, 79 N.W.2d 869 (1956), testimony was excluded, and in People v. Longaria, 333 Mich.
696, 53 N.W.2d 685 (1952), an exhibit was excluded which would have established an alibi. In
neither was notice given.
Minnesota-No cases.
New Jersey-No cases.
New York-In People v. Schade, note 45 supra,
and People v. Rakiec, note 58 supra, no notice was
given and evidence was excluded.
Ohio-In Balzhiser v. State, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 666
(Ohio Ct. App. 1931), oral notice was held insufficient and evidence was excluded. In State v.
Payne, 104 Ohio App. 410, 149 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1957), the statute was held to be "mandatory" in its terms.
Oklahoma-No cases.
South Dakota-No cases.
Utah--No cases.
Vermont-No cases.
Wisconsin-In State v. Selbach, 268 Wisc. 538,
68 N.W.2d 37 (1955), there was no written notice,
but oral notice was given shortly before trial. The
lawyer pleaded ignorance of the law, but the
evidence was excluded and the ruling was affirmed
on appeal.

